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Device-independent quantum key distribution provides security even when the equipment used
to communicate over the quantum channel is largely uncharacterized. An experimental demonstra-
tion of device-independent quantum key distribution is however challenging. A central obstacle in
photonic implementations is that the global detection efficiency, i.e., the probability that the sig-
nals sent over the quantum channel are successfully received, must be above a certain threshold.
We here propose a method to significantly relax this threshold, while maintaining provable device-
independent security. This is achieved with a protocol that adds artificial noise, which cannot be
known or controlled by an adversary, to the initial measurement data (the raw key). Focusing on a
realistic photonic setup using a source based on spontaneous parametric down conversion, we give
explicit bounds on the minimal required global detection efficiency.
a. Introduction.— Quantum key distribution
(QKD) allows two parties, Alice and Bob, who are
connected by a quantum channel, to generate a secret
key [1, 2]. QKD has been demonstrated in countless
experiments, see Refs. [3–5] for reviews. The security of
QKD, i.e., the claim that an adversary, Eve, who may
fully control the quantum channel, gains virtually no
information about the key, usually relies on the assump-
tions that (i) quantum theory is correct; (ii) Alice and
Bob can exchange classical messages authentically, i.e.,
an adversary cannot alter them; (iii) Alice and Bob’s
devices are trusted, i.e., they carry out precisely the
operations foreseen by the protocol [6].
The last assumption is hard to meet in practice.
This leads to vulnerabilities, as demonstrated by hack-
ing experiments [7–10]. The aim of device-independent
QKD is to overcome this problem — it provides secu-
rity even when assumption (iii) is not satisfied. One
usually distinguishes between different levels of device-
independence, depending on what the assumption is re-
placed with. In measurement-device-independent QKD,
one considers prepare-and-measure protocols and drops
assumption (iii) for the measurement device but not
for the preparation device [11–17]. One therefore still
needs to trust the latter to generate precisely calibrated
quantum states. This requirement is dropped in fully
device-independent QKD, which is the topic of this work.
Fully device-independent QKD protocols are
entanglement-based [2]. A completely untrusted
source distributes entangled signals to Alice and Bob
who measure them. Alice and Bob’s measurement
device is each modelled as a black box, which takes
as input a choice of measurement basis and outputs
the corresponding measurement outcome. Crucially,
however, one does not need to assume that the black
boxes actually carry out the intended measurement.
Instead of assumption (iii), it is then sufficient to assume
that any information that, according to the protocol,
must be processed locally by Alice and Bob remains in
their respective labs, that the inputs to the devices can
be chosen independently from all other devices, and that
their outputs are post-processed with trusted computers.
The generation of a secure key requires sufficiently
many signal pairs that are sufficiently strongly entangled.
The relevant measure of entanglement is the amount by
which the measurement statistics violates a Bell inequal-
ity, such as the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) in-
equality [18]. Intuitively, a significant violation of this
inequality guarantees that Alice and Bob’s state is close
to a two-qubit maximally entangled state which cannot
be shared with a third party [19, 20]. This, in turn, guar-
antees that Eve’s information about Alice and Bob’s mea-
surement outcomes is bounded. A mere violation of the
CHSH inequality is however not sufficient for secure key
distribution to be possible. Rather, the amount of viola-
tion must be above a certain threshold, which depends on
the global detection efficiency, i.e., the probability that
Alice’s measurement (the same applies to Bob’s measure-
ment) on a given pair of entangled signals is successful
[43]. For secure key distribution to be possible, it must be
above a threshold, which depends on the protocol as well
as on the security proofs [21–23]. The best (minimum)
threshold known so far is beyond the range achievable by
state-of-the-art experiments.
The main contribution of this Letter is to propose a
protocol for fully device-independent QKD that has a
significantly lower threshold for the global detection ef-
ficiency, and prove its security against general attacks.
The protocol includes a step where artificial noise is
added to the measurement outcomes — a method that
has been known to lead to improvements in conventional
(device-dependent) quantum cryptography [24–26]. The
additional noise damages both the correlation between
Alice and Bob and the correlation to Eve. But since the
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PBS
<latexit sha1_base64="Eqk8nMMFKa/Mg XkNtkW8XnxvjrI=">AAACxnicjVHLTsJAFD3UF+ILdemmkZi4Ii0bXRLcsMQgYILEtMO AE/rKdKohxMQfcKufZvwD/QvvjCVRidFp2p45954zc+/1k0CkynFeC9bS8srqWnG9tLG 5tb1T3t3rpnEmGe+wOIjlpe+lPBAR7yihAn6ZSO6FfsB7/uRMx3u3XKYiji7UNOGD0Bt HYiSYp4hqtxrt63LFqTpm2YvAzUEF+WrF5RdcYYgYDBlCcERQhAN4SOnpw4WDhLgBZsRJ QsLEOe5RIm1GWZwyPGIn9B3Trp+zEe21Z2rUjE4J6JWktHFEmpjyJGF9mm3imXHW7G/e M+Op7zalv597hcQq3BD7l26e+V+drkVhhFNTg6CaEsPo6ljukpmu6JvbX6pS5JAQp/GQ 4pIwM8p5n22jSU3tureeib+ZTM3qPctzM7zrW9KA3Z/jXATdWtV1qu55rVJv5KMu4gCHO KZ5nqCOJlrokPcYj3jCs9W0Iiuz7j5TrUKu2ce3ZT18ALnPj/w=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Eqk8nMMFKa/Mg XkNtkW8XnxvjrI=">AAACxnicjVHLTsJAFD3UF+ILdemmkZi4Ii0bXRLcsMQgYILEtMO AE/rKdKohxMQfcKufZvwD/QvvjCVRidFp2p45954zc+/1k0CkynFeC9bS8srqWnG9tLG 5tb1T3t3rpnEmGe+wOIjlpe+lPBAR7yihAn6ZSO6FfsB7/uRMx3u3XKYiji7UNOGD0Bt HYiSYp4hqtxrt63LFqTpm2YvAzUEF+WrF5RdcYYgYDBlCcERQhAN4SOnpw4WDhLgBZsRJ QsLEOe5RIm1GWZwyPGIn9B3Trp+zEe21Z2rUjE4J6JWktHFEmpjyJGF9mm3imXHW7G/e M+Op7zalv597hcQq3BD7l26e+V+drkVhhFNTg6CaEsPo6ljukpmu6JvbX6pS5JAQp/GQ 4pIwM8p5n22jSU3tureeib+ZTM3qPctzM7zrW9KA3Z/jXATdWtV1qu55rVJv5KMu4gCHO KZ5nqCOJlrokPcYj3jCs9W0Iiuz7j5TrUKu2ce3ZT18ALnPj/w=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Eqk8nMMFKa/Mg XkNtkW8XnxvjrI=">AAACxnicjVHLTsJAFD3UF+ILdemmkZi4Ii0bXRLcsMQgYILEtMO AE/rKdKohxMQfcKufZvwD/QvvjCVRidFp2p45954zc+/1k0CkynFeC9bS8srqWnG9tLG 5tb1T3t3rpnEmGe+wOIjlpe+lPBAR7yihAn6ZSO6FfsB7/uRMx3u3XKYiji7UNOGD0Bt HYiSYp4hqtxrt63LFqTpm2YvAzUEF+WrF5RdcYYgYDBlCcERQhAN4SOnpw4WDhLgBZsRJ QsLEOe5RIm1GWZwyPGIn9B3Trp+zEe21Z2rUjE4J6JWktHFEmpjyJGF9mm3imXHW7G/e M+Op7zalv597hcQq3BD7l26e+V+drkVhhFNTg6CaEsPo6ljukpmu6JvbX6pS5JAQp/GQ 4pIwM8p5n22jSU3tureeib+ZTM3qPctzM7zrW9KA3Z/jXATdWtV1qu55rVJv5KMu4gCHO KZ5nqCOJlrokPcYj3jCs9W0Iiuz7j5TrUKu2ce3ZT18ALnPj/w=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Eqk8nMMFKa/Mg XkNtkW8XnxvjrI=">AAACxnicjVHLTsJAFD3UF+ILdemmkZi4Ii0bXRLcsMQgYILEtMO AE/rKdKohxMQfcKufZvwD/QvvjCVRidFp2p45954zc+/1k0CkynFeC9bS8srqWnG9tLG 5tb1T3t3rpnEmGe+wOIjlpe+lPBAR7yihAn6ZSO6FfsB7/uRMx3u3XKYiji7UNOGD0Bt HYiSYp4hqtxrt63LFqTpm2YvAzUEF+WrF5RdcYYgYDBlCcERQhAN4SOnpw4WDhLgBZsRJ QsLEOe5RIm1GWZwyPGIn9B3Trp+zEe21Z2rUjE4J6JWktHFEmpjyJGF9mm3imXHW7G/e M+Op7zalv597hcQq3BD7l26e+V+drkVhhFNTg6CaEsPo6ljukpmu6JvbX6pS5JAQp/GQ 4pIwM8p5n22jSU3tureeib+ZTM3qPctzM7zrW9KA3Z/jXATdWtV1qu55rVJv5KMu4gCHO KZ5nqCOJlrokPcYj3jCs9W0Iiuz7j5TrUKu2ce3ZT18ALnPj/w=</latexit>
PBS
<latexit sha1_base64="Eqk8nMMFKa/MgXkNtkW8XnxvjrI=">AAACxnicjVHLTsJAF D3UF+ILdemmkZi4Ii0bXRLcsMQgYILEtMOAE/rKdKohxMQfcKufZvwD/QvvjCVRidFp2p45954zc+/1k0CkynFeC9bS8srqWnG9tLG5tb1T3t3rpnEmGe+wOIjlpe+lPBAR7yihA n6ZSO6FfsB7/uRMx3u3XKYiji7UNOGD0BtHYiSYp4hqtxrt63LFqTpm2YvAzUEF+WrF5RdcYYgYDBlCcERQhAN4SOnpw4WDhLgBZsRJQsLEOe5RIm1GWZwyPGIn9B3Trp+zEe21Z2 rUjE4J6JWktHFEmpjyJGF9mm3imXHW7G/eM+Op7zalv597hcQq3BD7l26e+V+drkVhhFNTg6CaEsPo6ljukpmu6JvbX6pS5JAQp/GQ4pIwM8p5n22jSU3tureeib+ZTM3qPctzM7 zrW9KA3Z/jXATdWtV1qu55rVJv5KMu4gCHOKZ5nqCOJlrokPcYj3jCs9W0Iiuz7j5TrUKu2ce3ZT18ALnPj/w=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Eqk8nMMFKa/MgXkNtkW8XnxvjrI=">AAACxnicjVHLTsJAF D3UF+ILdemmkZi4Ii0bXRLcsMQgYILEtMOAE/rKdKohxMQfcKufZvwD/QvvjCVRidFp2p45954zc+/1k0CkynFeC9bS8srqWnG9tLG5tb1T3t3rpnEmGe+wOIjlpe+lPBAR7yihA n6ZSO6FfsB7/uRMx3u3XKYiji7UNOGD0BtHYiSYp4hqtxrt63LFqTpm2YvAzUEF+WrF5RdcYYgYDBlCcERQhAN4SOnpw4WDhLgBZsRJQsLEOe5RIm1GWZwyPGIn9B3Trp+zEe21Z2 rUjE4J6JWktHFEmpjyJGF9mm3imXHW7G/eM+Op7zalv597hcQq3BD7l26e+V+drkVhhFNTg6CaEsPo6ljukpmu6JvbX6pS5JAQp/GQ4pIwM8p5n22jSU3tureeib+ZTM3qPctzM7 zrW9KA3Z/jXATdWtV1qu55rVJv5KMu4gCHOKZ5nqCOJlrokPcYj3jCs9W0Iiuz7j5TrUKu2ce3ZT18ALnPj/w=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Eqk8nMMFKa/MgXkNtkW8XnxvjrI=">AAACxnicjVHLTsJAF D3UF+ILdemmkZi4Ii0bXRLcsMQgYILEtMOAE/rKdKohxMQfcKufZvwD/QvvjCVRidFp2p45954zc+/1k0CkynFeC9bS8srqWnG9tLG5tb1T3t3rpnEmGe+wOIjlpe+lPBAR7yihA n6ZSO6FfsB7/uRMx3u3XKYiji7UNOGD0BtHYiSYp4hqtxrt63LFqTpm2YvAzUEF+WrF5RdcYYgYDBlCcERQhAN4SOnpw4WDhLgBZsRJQsLEOe5RIm1GWZwyPGIn9B3Trp+zEe21Z2 rUjE4J6JWktHFEmpjyJGF9mm3imXHW7G/eM+Op7zalv597hcQq3BD7l26e+V+drkVhhFNTg6CaEsPo6ljukpmu6JvbX6pS5JAQp/GQ4pIwM8p5n22jSU3tureeib+ZTM3qPctzM7 zrW9KA3Z/jXATdWtV1qu55rVJv5KMu4gCHOKZ5nqCOJlrokPcYj3jCs9W0Iiuz7j5TrUKu2ce3ZT18ALnPj/w=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Eqk8nMMFKa/MgXkNtkW8XnxvjrI=">AAACxnicjVHLTsJAF D3UF+ILdemmkZi4Ii0bXRLcsMQgYILEtMOAE/rKdKohxMQfcKufZvwD/QvvjCVRidFp2p45954zc+/1k0CkynFeC9bS8srqWnG9tLG5tb1T3t3rpnEmGe+wOIjlpe+lPBAR7yihA n6ZSO6FfsB7/uRMx3u3XKYiji7UNOGD0BtHYiSYp4hqtxrt63LFqTpm2YvAzUEF+WrF5RdcYYgYDBlCcERQhAN4SOnpw4WDhLgBZsRJQsLEOe5RIm1GWZwyPGIn9B3Trp+zEe21Z2 rUjE4J6JWktHFEmpjyJGF9mm3imXHW7G/eM+Op7zalv597hcQq3BD7l26e+V+drkVhhFNTg6CaEsPo6ljukpmu6JvbX6pS5JAQp/GQ4pIwM8p5n22jSU3tureeib+ZTM3qPctzM7 zrW9KA3Z/jXATdWtV1qu55rVJv5KMu4gCHOKZ5nqCOJlrokPcYj3jCs9W0Iiuz7j5TrUKu2ce3ZT18ALnPj/w=</latexit>SPDC
<latexit sha1_base64="n8gZle0NXxcOAt2nid8QQbXTBFg=">AAACx3icjVHLTsJAF D3UF+ILdemmkZi4Ii0bXRJxoTuMgiRITDsM0FA6zXRKJMSFP+BW/8z4B/oX3hlLohKj07Q9c+49Z+be68dhkCjHec1ZC4tLyyv51cLa+sbmVnF7p5mIVDLeYCIUsuV7CQ+DiDdUo ELeiiX3Rn7Ir/1hTcevx1wmgYiu1CTmnZHXj4JewDylqcv6ae22WHLKjln2PHAzUEK26qL4ght0IcCQYgSOCIpwCA8JPW24cBAT18GUOEkoMHGOexRIm1IWpwyP2CF9+7RrZ2xEe+ 2ZGDWjU0J6JSltHJBGUJ4krE+zTTw1zpr9zXtqPPXdJvT3M68RsQoDYv/SzTL/q9O1KPRwbGoIqKbYMLo6lrmkpiv65vaXqhQ5xMRp3KW4JMyMctZn22gSU7vurWfibyZTs3rPst wU7/qWNGD35zjnQbNSdp2ye1EpVU+yUeexh30c0jyPUMUZ6miQ9wCPeMKzdW4Ja2zdfaZauUyzi2/LevgAhH2QSw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="n8gZle0NXxcOAt2nid8QQbXTBFg=">AAACx3icjVHLTsJAF D3UF+ILdemmkZi4Ii0bXRJxoTuMgiRITDsM0FA6zXRKJMSFP+BW/8z4B/oX3hlLohKj07Q9c+49Z+be68dhkCjHec1ZC4tLyyv51cLa+sbmVnF7p5mIVDLeYCIUsuV7CQ+DiDdUo ELeiiX3Rn7Ir/1hTcevx1wmgYiu1CTmnZHXj4JewDylqcv6ae22WHLKjln2PHAzUEK26qL4ght0IcCQYgSOCIpwCA8JPW24cBAT18GUOEkoMHGOexRIm1IWpwyP2CF9+7RrZ2xEe+ 2ZGDWjU0J6JSltHJBGUJ4krE+zTTw1zpr9zXtqPPXdJvT3M68RsQoDYv/SzTL/q9O1KPRwbGoIqKbYMLo6lrmkpiv65vaXqhQ5xMRp3KW4JMyMctZn22gSU7vurWfibyZTs3rPst wU7/qWNGD35zjnQbNSdp2ye1EpVU+yUeexh30c0jyPUMUZ6miQ9wCPeMKzdW4Ja2zdfaZauUyzi2/LevgAhH2QSw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="n8gZle0NXxcOAt2nid8QQbXTBFg=">AAACx3icjVHLTsJAF D3UF+ILdemmkZi4Ii0bXRJxoTuMgiRITDsM0FA6zXRKJMSFP+BW/8z4B/oX3hlLohKj07Q9c+49Z+be68dhkCjHec1ZC4tLyyv51cLa+sbmVnF7p5mIVDLeYCIUsuV7CQ+DiDdUo ELeiiX3Rn7Ir/1hTcevx1wmgYiu1CTmnZHXj4JewDylqcv6ae22WHLKjln2PHAzUEK26qL4ght0IcCQYgSOCIpwCA8JPW24cBAT18GUOEkoMHGOexRIm1IWpwyP2CF9+7RrZ2xEe+ 2ZGDWjU0J6JSltHJBGUJ4krE+zTTw1zpr9zXtqPPXdJvT3M68RsQoDYv/SzTL/q9O1KPRwbGoIqKbYMLo6lrmkpiv65vaXqhQ5xMRp3KW4JMyMctZn22gSU7vurWfibyZTs3rPst wU7/qWNGD35zjnQbNSdp2ye1EpVU+yUeexh30c0jyPUMUZ6miQ9wCPeMKzdW4Ja2zdfaZauUyzi2/LevgAhH2QSw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="n8gZle0NXxcOAt2nid8QQbXTBFg=">AAACx3icjVHLTsJAF D3UF+ILdemmkZi4Ii0bXRJxoTuMgiRITDsM0FA6zXRKJMSFP+BW/8z4B/oX3hlLohKj07Q9c+49Z+be68dhkCjHec1ZC4tLyyv51cLa+sbmVnF7p5mIVDLeYCIUsuV7CQ+DiDdUo ELeiiX3Rn7Ir/1hTcevx1wmgYiu1CTmnZHXj4JewDylqcv6ae22WHLKjln2PHAzUEK26qL4ght0IcCQYgSOCIpwCA8JPW24cBAT18GUOEkoMHGOexRIm1IWpwyP2CF9+7RrZ2xEe+ 2ZGDWjU0J6JSltHJBGUJ4krE+zTTw1zpr9zXtqPPXdJvT3M68RsQoDYv/SzTL/q9O1KPRwbGoIqKbYMLo6lrmkpiv65vaXqhQ5xMRp3KW4JMyMctZn22gSU7vurWfibyZTs3rPst wU7/qWNGD35zjnQbNSdp2ye1EpVU+yUeexh30c0jyPUMUZ6miQ9wCPeMKzdW4Ja2zdfaZauUyzi2/LevgAhH2QSw==</latexit>
a
<latexit sha1_base64="bPuPkHVNpuKiCgIRsae zSL0w9Ms=">AAACxHicjVHLSsNAFD2Nr1pfVZdugkVwVZJudFkUxGUL9gG1SDKd1tA0CTMToRT9Abf6beI f6F94Z5yCWkQnJDlz7j1n5t4bZnEklee9Fpyl5ZXVteJ6aWNza3unvLvXlmkuGG+xNE5FNwwkj6OEt1SkY t7NBA8mYcw74fhcxzt3XMgoTa7UNOP9STBKomHEAkVUM7gpV7yqZ5a7CHwLKrCrkZZfcI0BUjDkmIAjgSI cI4CkpwcfHjLi+pgRJwhFJs5xjxJpc8rilBEQO6bviHY9yya0157SqBmdEtMrSOniiDQp5QnC+jTXxHPjr NnfvGfGU99tSv/Qek2IVbgl9i/dPPO/Ol2LwhCnpoaIasoMo6tj1iU3XdE3d79UpcghI07jAcUFYWaU8z6 7RiNN7bq3gYm/mUzN6j2zuTne9S1pwP7PcS6Cdq3qe1W/WavUz+yoizjAIY5pnieo4xINtIz3I57w7Fw4s SOd/DPVKVjNPr4t5+EDM9yPZA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="bPuPkHVNpuKiCgIRsae zSL0w9Ms=">AAACxHicjVHLSsNAFD2Nr1pfVZdugkVwVZJudFkUxGUL9gG1SDKd1tA0CTMToRT9Abf6beI f6F94Z5yCWkQnJDlz7j1n5t4bZnEklee9Fpyl5ZXVteJ6aWNza3unvLvXlmkuGG+xNE5FNwwkj6OEt1SkY t7NBA8mYcw74fhcxzt3XMgoTa7UNOP9STBKomHEAkVUM7gpV7yqZ5a7CHwLKrCrkZZfcI0BUjDkmIAjgSI cI4CkpwcfHjLi+pgRJwhFJs5xjxJpc8rilBEQO6bviHY9yya0157SqBmdEtMrSOniiDQp5QnC+jTXxHPjr NnfvGfGU99tSv/Qek2IVbgl9i/dPPO/Ol2LwhCnpoaIasoMo6tj1iU3XdE3d79UpcghI07jAcUFYWaU8z6 7RiNN7bq3gYm/mUzN6j2zuTne9S1pwP7PcS6Cdq3qe1W/WavUz+yoizjAIY5pnieo4xINtIz3I57w7Fw4s SOd/DPVKVjNPr4t5+EDM9yPZA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="bPuPkHVNpuKiCgIRsae zSL0w9Ms=">AAACxHicjVHLSsNAFD2Nr1pfVZdugkVwVZJudFkUxGUL9gG1SDKd1tA0CTMToRT9Abf6beI f6F94Z5yCWkQnJDlz7j1n5t4bZnEklee9Fpyl5ZXVteJ6aWNza3unvLvXlmkuGG+xNE5FNwwkj6OEt1SkY t7NBA8mYcw74fhcxzt3XMgoTa7UNOP9STBKomHEAkVUM7gpV7yqZ5a7CHwLKrCrkZZfcI0BUjDkmIAjgSI cI4CkpwcfHjLi+pgRJwhFJs5xjxJpc8rilBEQO6bviHY9yya0157SqBmdEtMrSOniiDQp5QnC+jTXxHPjr NnfvGfGU99tSv/Qek2IVbgl9i/dPPO/Ol2LwhCnpoaIasoMo6tj1iU3XdE3d79UpcghI07jAcUFYWaU8z6 7RiNN7bq3gYm/mUzN6j2zuTne9S1pwP7PcS6Cdq3qe1W/WavUz+yoizjAIY5pnieo4xINtIz3I57w7Fw4s SOd/DPVKVjNPr4t5+EDM9yPZA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="bPuPkHVNpuKiCgIRsae zSL0w9Ms=">AAACxHicjVHLSsNAFD2Nr1pfVZdugkVwVZJudFkUxGUL9gG1SDKd1tA0CTMToRT9Abf6beI f6F94Z5yCWkQnJDlz7j1n5t4bZnEklee9Fpyl5ZXVteJ6aWNza3unvLvXlmkuGG+xNE5FNwwkj6OEt1SkY t7NBA8mYcw74fhcxzt3XMgoTa7UNOP9STBKomHEAkVUM7gpV7yqZ5a7CHwLKrCrkZZfcI0BUjDkmIAjgSI cI4CkpwcfHjLi+pgRJwhFJs5xjxJpc8rilBEQO6bviHY9yya0157SqBmdEtMrSOniiDQp5QnC+jTXxHPjr NnfvGfGU99tSv/Qek2IVbgl9i/dPPO/Ol2LwhCnpoaIasoMo6tj1iU3XdE3d79UpcghI07jAcUFYWaU8z6 7RiNN7bq3gYm/mUzN6j2zuTne9S1pwP7PcS6Cdq3qe1W/WavUz+yoizjAIY5pnieo4xINtIz3I57w7Fw4s SOd/DPVKVjNPr4t5+EDM9yPZA==</latexit> b
<latexit sha1_base64="BrkJfdCh08Qtp/93Orz JkSxUYQk=">AAACxHicjVHLSsNAFD2Nr1pfVZdugkVwVZJudFkUxGUL9gG1SJJO69BpEmYmQin6A27128Q /0L/wzpiCWkQnJDlz7j1n5t4bpoIr7XmvBWdpeWV1rbhe2tjc2t4p7+61VZLJiLWiRCSyGwaKCR6zluZas G4qWTAJBeuE43MT79wxqXgSX+lpyvqTYBTzIY8CTVQzvClXvKpnl7sI/BxUkK9GUn7BNQZIECHDBAwxNGG BAIqeHnx4SInrY0acJMRtnOEeJdJmlMUoIyB2TN8R7Xo5G9PeeCqrjugUQa8kpYsj0iSUJwmb01wbz6yzY X/znllPc7cp/cPca0Ksxi2xf+nmmf/VmVo0hji1NXCqKbWMqS7KXTLbFXNz90tVmhxS4gweUFwSjqxy3mf XapSt3fQ2sPE3m2lYs4/y3Azv5pY0YP/nOBdBu1b1varfrFXqZ/moizjAIY5pnieo4xINtKz3I57w7Fw4w lFO9pnqFHLNPr4t5+EDNjyPZQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="BrkJfdCh08Qtp/93Orz JkSxUYQk=">AAACxHicjVHLSsNAFD2Nr1pfVZdugkVwVZJudFkUxGUL9gG1SJJO69BpEmYmQin6A27128Q /0L/wzpiCWkQnJDlz7j1n5t4bpoIr7XmvBWdpeWV1rbhe2tjc2t4p7+61VZLJiLWiRCSyGwaKCR6zluZas G4qWTAJBeuE43MT79wxqXgSX+lpyvqTYBTzIY8CTVQzvClXvKpnl7sI/BxUkK9GUn7BNQZIECHDBAwxNGG BAIqeHnx4SInrY0acJMRtnOEeJdJmlMUoIyB2TN8R7Xo5G9PeeCqrjugUQa8kpYsj0iSUJwmb01wbz6yzY X/znllPc7cp/cPca0Ksxi2xf+nmmf/VmVo0hji1NXCqKbWMqS7KXTLbFXNz90tVmhxS4gweUFwSjqxy3mf XapSt3fQ2sPE3m2lYs4/y3Azv5pY0YP/nOBdBu1b1varfrFXqZ/moizjAIY5pnieo4xINtKz3I57w7Fw4w lFO9pnqFHLNPr4t5+EDNjyPZQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="BrkJfdCh08Qtp/93Orz JkSxUYQk=">AAACxHicjVHLSsNAFD2Nr1pfVZdugkVwVZJudFkUxGUL9gG1SJJO69BpEmYmQin6A27128Q /0L/wzpiCWkQnJDlz7j1n5t4bpoIr7XmvBWdpeWV1rbhe2tjc2t4p7+61VZLJiLWiRCSyGwaKCR6zluZas G4qWTAJBeuE43MT79wxqXgSX+lpyvqTYBTzIY8CTVQzvClXvKpnl7sI/BxUkK9GUn7BNQZIECHDBAwxNGG BAIqeHnx4SInrY0acJMRtnOEeJdJmlMUoIyB2TN8R7Xo5G9PeeCqrjugUQa8kpYsj0iSUJwmb01wbz6yzY X/znllPc7cp/cPca0Ksxi2xf+nmmf/VmVo0hji1NXCqKbWMqS7KXTLbFXNz90tVmhxS4gweUFwSjqxy3mf XapSt3fQ2sPE3m2lYs4/y3Azv5pY0YP/nOBdBu1b1varfrFXqZ/moizjAIY5pnieo4xINtKz3I57w7Fw4w lFO9pnqFHLNPr4t5+EDNjyPZQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="BrkJfdCh08Qtp/93Orz JkSxUYQk=">AAACxHicjVHLSsNAFD2Nr1pfVZdugkVwVZJudFkUxGUL9gG1SJJO69BpEmYmQin6A27128Q /0L/wzpiCWkQnJDlz7j1n5t4bpoIr7XmvBWdpeWV1rbhe2tjc2t4p7+61VZLJiLWiRCSyGwaKCR6zluZas G4qWTAJBeuE43MT79wxqXgSX+lpyvqTYBTzIY8CTVQzvClXvKpnl7sI/BxUkK9GUn7BNQZIECHDBAwxNGG BAIqeHnx4SInrY0acJMRtnOEeJdJmlMUoIyB2TN8R7Xo5G9PeeCqrjugUQa8kpYsj0iSUJwmb01wbz6yzY X/znllPc7cp/cPca0Ksxi2xf+nmmf/VmVo0hji1NXCqKbWMqS7KXTLbFXNz90tVmhxS4gweUFwSjqxy3mf XapSt3fQ2sPE3m2lYs4/y3Azv5pY0YP/nOBdBu1b1varfrFXqZ/moizjAIY5pnieo4xINtKz3I57w7Fw4w lFO9pnqFHLNPr4t5+EDNjyPZQ==</latexit>
FIG. 1: Experimental platform envisioned for a device-
independent implementation of quantum key distribution. A
source (red star) based on spontaneous parametric down con-
version (SPDC) is used to create photon pairs entangled in
polarization. Alice receives mode a while Bob receives mode
b, and they perform measurements using a polarising beam-
splitter (PBS) and two detectors. A set of wave-plates (λ
4
, λ
2
)
allow them to choose the measurement setting.
possibility to generate a key depends on the difference
between the strengths of these correlations, the net ef-
fect can still be positive. As our calculations show, this
is indeed the case.
For concreteness, we consider an implementation on
an optics platform as shown in Fig. 1, where entangled
photons are generated by spontaneous parametric down
conversion (SPDC) and measured with photon counting
techniques. Such a setup is appealing as it enables high
repetition rates, so that a key can be generated after a
reasonable running time. We will however need to take
into account that the statistics of this photon source
intrinsically limits the maximum CHSH violation [27].
In this context, we prove that noisy pre-processing
provides a significant reduction of the requirement on
the detection efficiency.
b. Protocol.— For our device-independent QKD
protocol, we consider a source that repeatedly distributes
a pair of entangled signals (encoded in photonic modes)
to Alice and Bob. Alice measures her part of each pair
using a measurement Ax with setting x ∈ {0, 1, 2} chosen
at random. Similarly, Bob measures his part with a mea-
surement By where y ∈ {1, 2} is a random setting. While
the measurement outcomes may in general be non-binary,
we suppose that for x, y ∈ {1, 2} they are processed lo-
cally and turned into binary values Ax,By ∈ {−1,+1} for
Alice and Bob, respectively. In a parameter estimation
step, Alice and Bob communicate classically to estimate,
using a sample of their results, the CHSH score
S = 〈A1B1〉+ 〈A1B2〉+ 〈A2B1〉 − 〈A2B2〉 (1)
where
〈AxBy〉 = p(Ax = By|x, y)− p(Ax 6= By|x, y) (2)
quantifies the correlation between the outcomes for mea-
surement choices x and y, respectively. The measure-
ment setting x = 0 does not enter the score, but instead
is chosen to generate an outcome A0 that minimises the
uncertainty about B1 (quantified in terms of H(Bˆ1|A0),
see Eq. (3) below). Bob then forms the raw key from
the outcomes B1 of the pairs that Alice measured with
respect to x = 0.
The next step of our protocol is known as noisy
pre-processing [24–26]. Bob is instructed to generate
new raw key bits Bˆ1 by flipping each of the bits B1
of his initial raw key independently with probability p.
The protocol then proceeds with an error correction step
that allows Alice to infer Bob’s new (noisy) raw key. In
a final privacy amplification step, Alice and Bob apply
a hash function to this raw key to obtain the final secret
key.
c. Key generation rate from CHSH score.— Sup-
pose that the source has emitted n pairs of entangled sig-
nals, and denote their joint quantum state by ΨABE . In
the device-independent scenario, nothing is known about
this state, nor the state space. Using the entropy accu-
mulation theorem, one can show however that the en-
tropic quantities that are relevant for measuring Eve’s
information are (up to terms that are sublinear in n)
basically the same as the case where the devices are
memoryless and behave identically and independently
in each communication round of the protocol [23]. In
particular, we may assume that ΨABE = ψ
⊗n
ABE where
ψABE ∈ HA⊗HB ⊗HE is a tri-partite state compatible
with the CHSH score. We note however that the dimen-
sion dA/B = HA/B of Alice and Bob’s state space may
still be arbitrary.
In the asymptotic limit of large n, the key generation
rate when optimal one-way error correction and privacy
amplification is used is given by [28]
r = H(Bˆ1|E)−H(Bˆ1|A0), (3)
where H is the von Neumann entropy (which includes
the Shannon entropy as a special case). The first term,
which quantifies Eve’s uncertainty, can be expanded as
H(Bˆ1|E) = H(Bˆ1)−
(
H(ρE)−
∑
b
pbH(ρˆE|b)
)
, (4)
where ρE = trAB |ψABE〉〈ψABE | is Eve’s reduced state
and ρˆE|b is Eve’s state conditioned on the event that
Bob’s noisy key bit Bˆ1 equals b, which occurs with prob-
ability pb. By showing the equivalence of the protocol to
one that includes a symmetrisation step (see Supplemen-
tal Material, Appendix A), where Bob flips the outcomes
of each raw key bit B1 depending on a public random
string, one can assume without loss of generality that
pb =
1
2 .
To bound H(ρE) and H(ρˆE|b), we use the approach
presented in [21], which we briefly outline here (see Sup-
plemental Material, Appendix B). There, one first uses
Jordan’s lemma [29] to choose a basis forHA in which the
observables Ax for x ∈ {1, 2} are simultaneously block di-
agonal, with blocks of dimension at most 2 that we label
3λ. This can be expressed via a factorization of Alice’s
Hilbert space in the form HA = HA′ ⊗HA′′ so that her
measurement operators are given by
Ax =
∑
λ
Aλx ⊗ |λ〉〈λ| (5)
where Aλx are qubit Pauli measurements and {|λ〉} form
an orthonormal basis for A′′. Similarly, for Bob we can
write By =
∑
µB
µ
y ⊗ |µ〉〈µ|. Since there are two possible
measurements for Alice and Bob, the Pauli measurements
Aλx and B
µ
y can be taken to define the X-Z planes of the
Bloch spheres in each block.
By introducing an ancilla HR′′ that is a copy of
HA′′ ⊗ HB′′ , one can bound (see Supplemental Mate-
rial, Appendix B) Eve’s uncertainty on Bˆ1 by instead
bounding H(Bˆ1|ER′′) for states of the form∑
λµ
pλµ|λµλµ〉〈λµλµ|A′′B′′R′′ ⊗ |Ψλµ〉〈Ψλµ|A′B′E (6)
with
|Ψλµ〉A′B′E =
4∑
i=1
√
Li|Φi〉A′B′ |i〉E (7)
where |Φi〉, for i = 1, . . . , 4, form a Bell basis (with re-
spect to the X-Z plane defined by the measurements)
and the weights Li can be taken to satisfy L1 ≥ L2, L3 ≥
L4[44]. The block-diagonal structure of the state implies
H(Bˆ1|ER′′) =
∑
λµ pλµH(Bˆ1|E)Ψλµ , where H(Bˆ1|E)Ψλµ
is the value produced by the state |Ψλµ〉A′B′E after mea-
surement and noisy pre-processing.
We now evaluate Eq. (4) for any single block defined by
λ and µ. Let Sλµ be the CHSH score of the block. The
term H(ρλµE ) for this block is simply the entropy of the
weight distribution L = (L1, . . . , L4). The term H(ρˆ
λµ
E|b)
is more complicated to compute as the conditional states
ρˆλµE|b also depend on the angle φ of Bob’s measurement
B1(φ) = cos(φ)σz + sin(φ)σx, and the amount of noise
added. The effect of the latter is to mix the conditional
states corresponding to the two possible outcomes ±1
ρˆλµE|b=±1 = (1− p)ρλµE|b=±1 + p ρλµE|b=∓1, (8)
where ρλµE|b=±1 = trA′B′1A′E ⊗
(1±B1(φ)) |Ψλµ〉〈Ψλµ|A′B′E . In contrast to the
conditional states ρλµE|b=±1 without noise, the eigenvalues
of the states ρˆλµE|b=±1 do not have a simple expression,
hence making the computation of H(ρˆλµE|b=±1) more
difficult than in the absence of noisy pre-processing [21].
However, we can show that Eve’s uncertainty
H(Bˆ1|E)Ψλµ is an increasing function of the angle φ ∈
[0, pi/2] of Bob’s measurement, see Appendix C sec-
tion 1. This allows us to conclude that Eve’s infor-
mation is maximized for φ = 0. In a next step, we
show that H(Bˆ1|E)Ψλµ is minimized for L2 = L4 = 0,
L1 =
1
4
(
2 +
√
(Sλµ)2 − 4
)
and L3 = 1 − L1, see Sup-
plemental Material, Appendix C section 2. This shows
the state and measurement minimizing Eve’s ignorance is
independent of p, and hence identical to the one for the
case where Bob does not introduce any artificial noise.
The resulting bound on Eve’s uncertainty is of the form
H(Bˆ1|E)Ψλµ ≥ 1− Ip(Sλµ) with
Ip(S) =h
(
1 +
√
(S/2)2 − 1
2
)
−h
(
1 +
√
1− p(1− p)(8− S2)
2
)
,
(9)
where h denotes the binary entropy, see Supplemen-
tal Material, Appendix C section 2. Combining the
convexity of the function 1 − Ip(S) with the relation
H(Bˆ1|ER′′) =
∑
λµ pλµH(Bˆ1|E)Ψλµ for the state (6), we
deduce the overall bound
H(Bˆ1|ER′′) ≥ 1− Ip(S). (10)
In particular, it follows from Eq. (3) that the secret key
rate with optimal error correction satisfies
r ≥ 1− Ip(S)−H(Bˆ1|A0). (11)
d. Optics implementation.— It has been recently
shown by multiple experiments that it is possible to vi-
olate a Bell inequality (without the need of a fair sam-
pling assumption) with an optical implementation [30–
35], similar to the one shown in Fig. 1. An SPDC source
produces a bipartite state according to the Hamiltonian
H = i
∑N
k=1(χa
†
kb
†
k,⊥−χ¯a†k,⊥b†k−h.c.), where the bosonic
operators ak, ak,⊥(bk, bk,⊥) refer to one of the N modes
received by Alice (Bob) with two possible polarizations
labelled with and without the subscript ⊥. χ and χ¯ are
related to the non-linear susceptibility and can be con-
trolled by appropriately tuning the pump power and its
polarization. The resulting state is given by
|ψ〉 = (1− T 2g )N/2(1− T 2g¯ )N/2ΠNk=1eTga
†
kb
†
k,⊥−Tg¯a†k,⊥b†k |0〉
where Tg = tanh g and Tg¯ = tanh g¯ with g = χt
and g¯ = χ¯t squeezing parameters related to a†kb
†
k,⊥ and
a†k,⊥b
†
k, respectively. Measurements are done with a po-
larization beamsplitter and two non-photon number re-
solving detectors. A set of wave-plates is finally used to
choose the measurement setting locally.
In such an optical implementation, each of the mea-
surements applied by Alice and Bob has four possible
outcomes: no-click on both detectors, one click in either
one of the two detectors, and two clicks. In the case of
A1, A2, B1, and B2, these results are binned to form the
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FIG. 2: Key rates vs system efficiency for the protocols based
on a SPDC type source combined with photon counting tech-
niques described in the main text. The key rate obtained
from Ref. [21], where the error correction cost is computed
from the quantum bit error rate, shows positive key rates at
η ≥ 92.7% (dashed black curve). The use of a refinement
proposed in Ref. [36] where the error correction cost is esti-
mated directly from the measurement results, improves it to
90.9% (dashed-dotted red curve). Further employing noisy
pre-processing brings the critical efficiency to 83.2% (solid
blue curve).
binary values required for the computation of S. For ex-
ample, Alice may set A1 = 1 if she observed one click in
one specific detector and none in the other, and A1 = −1
for the other three variants. However, following the pro-
posal presented in Ref. [36], no such binning is carried
out for A0, because this value is used only for error cor-
rection.
A central performance parameter for Bell-type ex-
periments is the detection efficiency ηA (ηB) , which is
defined as the overall probability for a photon emitted
from the source to be detected at Alice’s (Bob’s) loca-
tion [37]. We assume that Alice’s and Bob’s detection
efficiencies are equal; ηA = ηB = η. We now use Eq. (11)
to determine the threshold for η above which the secret
key rate is positive. For this, we optimise the number
of modes N which affects the photon statistics, the
squeezing parameters g and g¯ which change the average
number of photons in each mode, the measurement
settings, and the noise parameter p, see Supplemental
Material, Appendix D.
e. Results and comparison to other protocols.— Our
main finding, shown as a blue solid line in Fig. 2, is that
a positive key rate can be obtained with an SPDC source
as soon as the detection efficiency is larger than 83.2%.
For comparison, we consider the protocol studied
in [21]. The difference to our protocol are two-fold.
Firstly, no artificial noise is added, i.e., p = 0. Secondly,
A0 is taken to be a binary value. In this case, the bound
on the rate reduces to
r ≥ 1− h
(
1 +
√
(S/2)2 − 1
2
)
− h(Q) (12)
where Q = p(A0 6= B1) is the quantum bit error rate. The
bound corresponds to the black dashed line in Fig. 2. The
maximum key rate is below 1 for unit detection efficiency
due to the photon statistics. The key rate decreases as
the efficiency decreases and a minimum global detection
efficiency of η = 92.7% is needed to have a positive key
rate.
If we consider instead a protocol like the one in [21], but
with error correction that uses the four-valued outcome
A0 (the four possible outcomes correspond physically to
i) no click at all, ii) and iii) one click exactly in one of the
two detectors and iv) a twofold coincidence) instead of its
binarisation, one already obtains an improvement [36].
The rate is now given by
r ≥ 1− h
(
1 +
√
(S/2)2 − 1
2
)
−H(B1|A0), (13)
and represented as the red dashed-dotted line in Fig. 2.
(See Supplemental Material, Appendix A for details
regarding the computation of H(B1|A0).) The maximum
rate is essentially unchanged but the behaviour as a
function of the detection efficiency is different. In partic-
ular, the threshold for the global detection efficiency is
90.9%. Furthermore, when adding noisy pre-processing
of the raw key into the protocol of Ref. [21] with error
correction using the four valued outcome A0 [36], the
requirement on the detection efficiency goes down to
83.2%.
f. Discussions and conclusion.— SPDC sources al-
lowed several groups worldwide to test Bell inequalities
without detection loopholes [30–35] and to conclude the
existence of non-local causal correlations with a high sta-
tistical confidence. The observed violation of Bell in-
equalities in these experiments was however very limited
due the intrinsic photon statistics and non-unit detec-
tion efficiency. One may thus wonder whether an ex-
tension of existing detection-loophole-free Bell tests to
device-independent QKD is even possible. We computed
the requirement on the detection efficiency using known
security proofs. We then significantly reduced this re-
quirement by deriving a new security proof for the case
where noisy pre-processing is applied before further clas-
sical processing.
Noisy pre-processing of the raw key was known to in-
crease the resistance to noise of conventional QKD. For
BB84 [1] for example, the critical quantum bit error rate
goes from 11% without noisy pre-processing to 12.4%
with it – a 13% relative improvement [24–26]. In the
case of DIQKD, noisy pre-processing lowers the efficiency
from 90.9% to 83.2% a relative tolerance improvement of
78%. This might have dramatic consequences for the
5prospect of realizing DIQKD experimentally. A detailed
feasibility study using a SPDC source is on-going, and
first estimates accounting for noise and finite-statistics
effects are promising for demonstrating that a key can
be distributed over short distances with fully device-
independent security guarantees.
Note that our results are also relevant in a relaxed
device-independent scenario where one assumes that a
part of the local noise of Alice’s and Bob’s device is well
characterized and cannot be controlled by Eve. Given
the amount of such “trusted” noise for both parties, pA
and pB , we can reconstruct the CHSH value that would
be observed without this noise. The latter can then be
used to bound Eve’s information using Ineq. (9), where
p can be taken to be equal to pB (or, by adding extra
artificial noise, a larger value). By strengthening the
assumption (that some noise is not under control of Eve)
one can thus further improve the efficiency, i.e. a positive
key rate can be obtained with reduced requirements on
the detection efficiency.
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Appendix A: Understanding the symmetrisation step
We first give a detailed description of the symmetrisation step — in particular, when the outcome of the measurement
A0 is not binary-valued, some care needs to be taken in interpreting this process. For this section, it is convenient
to interpret all two-outcome measurements as giving outcomes in Z2 rather than {−1,+1}, in contrast to the rest of
this work. Addition modulo 2 will be denoted as ⊕.
To start with, consider the situation where noisy pre-processing is not applied. In that case, we should understand
symmetrisation to be carried out as follows: Bob generates a uniform random bit T and transforms his measurement
output to B′y = By ⊕ T, then sends T to Alice over a public channel. If Alice performed measurement A1 or A2, she
transforms her measurement output to A′x = Ax⊕T as well (hence the CHSH value is invariant under this procedure);
however, if she performed measurement A0, she simply stores the value of the bit T. In that case, the cost of one-way
error correction from Bob to Alice is supposed to be quantified by H(B′1|A0T), rather than H(B1|A0). For the purpose
of computing this value, however, we note that [38] (letting T′ be a copy of T)
H(B1|A0) = H(B1A0)−H(A0) +H(T′T)−H(T) (A1)
= H(B1T
′|A0T) since T′,T are independent of B1,A0 (A2)
= H(B′1T
′|A0T) (A3)
= H(B′1A0T)−H(A0T) since H(B′1T′A0T) = H(B′1A0T) (A4)
= H(B′1|A0T), (A5)
where line (A3) holds because knowing any two out of (B1,B
′
1,T
′) completely determines the third value. Hence to
know the value of H(B′1|A0T), we can simply compute H(B1|A0) instead (which can be done directly from the known
distribution PB1A0).
We now consider how noisy pre-processing interacts with the symmetrisation step. Note that noisy pre-processing
can be modelled as replacing the symmetrised bit B′1 by Bˆ
′
1 = B
′
1⊕Tˆ, where Tˆ is a biased random bit with P(T = 1) = p.
Then we have Bˆ′1 = B1 ⊕ Tˆ⊕T′, so we see that the operations of symmetrisation and noisy pre-processing commute,
and we can perform an analysis based on either ordering. For deriving bounds on H(Bˆ′1|ET) in the subsequent
sections, it will be convenient to assume symmetrisation is applied before noisy pre-processing. However, when
computing the error-correction term H(Bˆ′1|A0T), it is more convenient to assume noisy pre-processing is applied
before symmetrisation, since we can then apply the same argument as in the preceding paragraph to show this is
equal to H(Bˆ1|A0), so we can simply compute the latter instead (from the known distribution PBˆ1A0).
By exploiting the fact that these operations commute, we can also argue that in fact the symmetrisation step is purely
for convenience in the proofs and unnecessary to implement in practice, following the approach in [38]. Specifically, the
bounds we derive in the subsequent sections are bounds on H(Bˆ′1|ET). However, if noisy pre-processing is performed
first and the symmetrisation step is omitted, then the same calculation as that leading to (A5) (with Bˆ1, Bˆ
′
1, E in
place of B1,B
′
1,A0 respectively) shows that H(Bˆ1|E) = H(Bˆ′1|ET). Hence our bounds are also valid for H(Bˆ1|E),
i.e. the value without implementing the symmetrisation step.
6Appendix B: Bell-diagonal reduction
The aim of this section is, qualitatively speaking, to prove that we can restrict our analysis to Eve performing a
“classical mixture” of strategies parametrised by indices (λ, µ), where for each value of (λ, µ), the Alice-Bob-Eve state
is of the form
|Ψλµ〉A′B′E =
4∑
i=1
√
Li|Φi〉A′B′ |i〉E , (B1)
where |Φ1〉 = |Φ+〉, |Φ2〉 = |Ψ−〉, |Φ3〉 = |Φ−〉 and |Φ4〉 = |Ψ+〉 are the four Bell states, and L is a vector of
probabilities that can be taken to satisfy L1 ≥ L2 and L3 ≥ L4. Additionally, for each (λ, µ) the corresponding
measurements can be assumed to be qubit Pauli measurements in the X-Z plane of the Bloch sphere. The proof is
very similar to that in Ref. [21], though we present the argument in a slightly different order to make it clear that
it still applies even with noisy pre-processing. The calculations performed in this section are all straightforward, but
are given in some detail for completeness.
Consider any state and measurements that could be used in the protocol, giving rise to some probability distribution
P(a, b|x, y). (We will generally use small letters to denote values taken by random variables, and capital letters to
denote the random variables (equivalently, classical registers) themselves.) A symmetrisation step is then implemented
on all measurement outcomes via a publicly communicated bit T, yielding symmetrised probabilities P′(a, b|x, y) =
(P(a, b|x, y) + P(a, b|x, y))/2, where we use the abbreviated notation c := −c for c ∈ {−1,+1}. We will use the
notation B1 for the outcome of Bob’s first measurement and B
′
1 for his bit after symmetrization (similarly for Alice).
After the symmetrisation step, noisy pre-processing is applied, giving rise to some final conditional entropy H(Bˆ′1|ET)
(we will use Bˆ′1 to denote the result of the noisy pre-processing applied to B
′
1). Our goal is to find a lower bound
on H(Bˆ′1|ET) that would hold for all states and measurements producing the outcome probabilities P′(a, b|x, y) after
symmetrisation. (In principle, one could instead use the unsymmetrised probabilities P(a, b|x, y) as the constraints,
but this will not be what we consider in this work.)
As a first step, we observe that the combined process of measuring the state and symmetrising the outcomes can
be viewed as Alice and Bob’s devices making joint measurements across their quantum systems and their local copies
of T. (Explicitly, if the state was originally ρ0ABE and the measurements P
0
a|x, P
0
b|y, we could consider the combined
process to be applying the measurements Pa|x = P 0a|x ⊗ |0〉〈0|+ P 0a|x ⊗ |1〉〈1|, Pb|y = P 0b|y ⊗ |0〉〈0|+ P 0b|y ⊗ |1〉〈1| to the
state ρ0ABE ⊗ (|000〉〈000|+ |111〉〈111|)/2.) Since we are interested in bounding the conditional entropy of Bˆ′1 produced
from the post-symmetrisation outcomes, it would suffice to find a bound on H(Bˆ′1|E) that would hold for any state
ρABE and measurements producing the outcome distribution P
′(a, b|x, y), since in particular this would include the
state and measurements that describe the combined measurement-and-symmetrisation process. Therefore, we focus
on bounding H(Bˆ′1|E) for states and measurements directly producing P′(a, b|x, y). Also, we can restrict ourselves to
pure states without loss of generality, since if the state is mixed we can simply extend E to include its purification
without reducing Eve’s power, due to the data-processing inequality. The measurements can also be assumed to be
projective by performing an appropriate Naimark dilation that preserves both the outcome probabilities and Eve’s
conditional states; see for instance [39] for details.
Having reduced to this scenario, now consider any pure state |ψ〉ABE and projective measurements Pa|x, Pb|y
producing the outcome distribution P′(a, b|x, y). Since Alice only has two possible measurements and each has two
outcomes, by Jordan’s lemma [21, 40] all her projectors can be written as a direct sum of qubit projectors, which we
express by factorising her Hilbert space as A = A′ ⊗A′′ and writing:
Pa|x =
∑
λ
Pλa|x ⊗ |λ〉〈λ|, (B2)
where all Pλa|x are rank-1 projectors on a qubit system A
′, and {|λ〉} forms an orthonormal basis for A′′. Similarly,
for Bob we can write Pb|y =
∑
µ P
µ
b|y ⊗ |µ〉〈µ|. Since |λ〉, |µ〉 form bases for A′′, B′′, we can always write
|ψ〉ABE =
∑
λµ
√
pλµ|λµ〉A′′B′′ ⊗ |ψλµ〉A′B′E , (B3)
for some probability distribution pλµ. If the measurements (x, y) are performed and the outcomes (a, b) are obtained,
Eve’s (subnormalised) conditional states are easily computed to be[45]
ρE|axby =
∑
λµ
pλµ ρ
λµ
E|axby , where ρ
λµ
E|axby := TrA′B′
[
(Pλa|x ⊗ Pµb|y ⊗ IE)|ψλµ〉A′B′E
]
, (B4)
7introducing an abbreviated notation Trα[|Ψ〉] := Trα[|Ψ〉〈Ψ|] for pure states. All our quantities of interest are com-
pletely determined by the states ρE|axby . Specifically, we have P
′(a, b|x, y) = Tr[ρE|axby ], and in the case where Bob
performs the key-generating measurement, Eve’s states conditioned on the outcome are ρE|b1 =
∑
ax
ρE|axb1 (where
any input x for Alice can be chosen, due to no-signalling. After noisy pre-processing (which can be modelled as the
mapping |b〉〈b| → (1− p)|b〉〈b|+ p|b〉〈b|), the final c-q state can be directly computed as
ρˆ
Bˆ
′
1E
=
∑
b1
|b1〉〈b1|Bˆ′1 ⊗
∑
λµ
pλµ ρˆ
λµ
E|b1
 , where ρˆλµE|b1 := (1− p)ρλµE|b1 + pρλµE|b1 . (B5)
Our objective is to bound H(Bˆ′1|E)ρˆ. Note that by concavity of the conditional entropy, we have∑
λµ pλµH(Bˆ
′
1|E)ρˆλµ ≤ H(Bˆ′1|E)ρˆ, where H(Bˆ′1|E)ρˆλµ refers to the value that would be given by the conditional
states ρˆλµE|b1 .
We shall now show that if we introduce systems R,R′, R′′ with dimensions dim(R) = dim(R′) = 2 and dim(R′′) =
dim(A′′) dim(B′′), we can define a state σABERR′R′′ in the form[46]
σ =
∑
λµ
pλµ|λµ〉〈λµ|A′′B′′ ⊗ |λµ〉〈λµ|R′′ ⊗ σλµA′B′ERR′ where σλµA′B′ = TrERR′σλµA′B′ERR′ are Bell-diagonal, (B6)
such that when the measurements Pa|x, Pb|y are performed on σ, we get outcome distribution P′(a, b|x, y), and after per-
forming noisy pre-processing to get a state σˆ
Bˆ
′
1ERR
′R′′ , we have H(Bˆ
′
1|ERR′R′′)σˆ =
∑
λµ pλµH(Bˆ
′
1|E)ρˆλµ ≤ H(Bˆ′1|E)ρˆ.
Hence when finding the minimum conditional entropy over all states compatible with P′(a, b|x, y), we can restrict our-
selves to states in the form (B6).
To achieve this, we define
σλµA′B′ERR′ :=
∑
rr′
1
4
|rr′〉〈rr′|RR′ ⊗ |φλµrr
′〉〈φλµrr′ |A′B′E ,
with |φλµ00〉 := |ψλµ〉, |φλµ10〉 := UY Y |ψλµ〉, |φλµ01〉 := |ψλµ〉∗, |φλµ11〉 :=
(
UY Y |ψλµ〉
)∗
.
(B7)
Here we denote UY Y := σY ⊗ σY ⊗ IE , and the Pauli operators σY and complex conjugate ∗ are both defined with
respect to a specific basis constructed in [21] that ensures the reduced states σλµA′B′ are Bell-diagonal. To briefly
outline the construction: if we pick any local bases for A′, B′ and define σY with respect to those bases, the state
ωλµA′B′ := (1/2)TrE
[|φλµ00〉〈φλµ00|A′B′E + |φλµ10〉〈φλµ10|A′B′E] will be block-diagonal (in 2× 2 blocks) in the induced
Bell basis, leaving only two nonzero off-diagonal terms. In particular, there is enough freedom in the basis choice to
pick one in which Pλa|x, P
µ
b|y describe Pauli measurements in the X-Z plane and the remaining off-diagonal terms of
ωλµA′B′ are purely imaginary. In that case, we see from definition (B7) that σ
λµ
A′B′ = ω
λµ
A′B′ +
(
ωλµA′B′
)∗
will indeed be
Bell-diagonal. Finally, there is still enough freedom in the basis choices to ensure that the Bell-state weights can be
ordered such that L1 ≥ L2 and L3 ≥ L4.
For the state σ, Eve’s conditional states are straightforwardly computed:
σERR′R′′|axby =
∑
λµrr′
1
4
pλµ |λµrr′〉〈λµrr′|R′′RR′ ⊗ σλµrr
′
E|axby ,
where σλµrr
′
E|axby := TrA′B′
[
(Pλa|x ⊗ Pµb|y ⊗ IE)|φλµrr
′〉A′B′E
]
.
(B8)
Recall that all Pλa|x, P
µ
b|y describe Pauli measurements in the X-Z plane. Therefore, we have σY P
λ
a|xσY = P
λ
a|x and
analogously for Pλb|y. By cyclicity of partial trace, this implies σ
λµ10
E|axby = σ
λµ00
E|axby . Additionally, taking the complex
conjugate of the state does not affect the outcome probabilities because all matrix elements of Pλa|x, P
µ
b|y are real.
Hence as claimed, the outcome probabilities are indeed equal to∑
λµrr′
pλµ
4
Tr
[
σλµrr
′
E|axby
]
=
∑
λµr
pλµ
2
Tr
[
σλµr0E|axby
]
=
P′(a, b|x, y) + P′(a, b|x, y)
2
= P′(a, b|x, y). (B9)
(Note that the individual terms Tr
[
σλµr0E|axby
]
may not be symmetrised, but after summing over λµ, they yield the
distribution P′, which is symmetrised by definition.)
8Eve’s conditional states after noisy pre-processing are straightforwardly computed (writing σλµrr
′
E|b1 =
∑
ax
σλµrr
′
E|axb1):
σˆERR′R′′|b1 =
∑
λµrr′
1
4
pλµ |λµrr′〉〈λµrr′|RR′R′′ ⊗ σˆλµrr
′
E|b1 , where σˆ
λµrr′
E|b1 = (1− p)σ
λµrr′
E|b1 + pσ
λµrr′
E|b1 . (B10)
Since RR′R′′ are classical registers, we have H(Bˆ′1|ERR′R′′)σˆ =
∑
λµrr′(pλµ/4)H(Bˆ
′
1|E)σˆλµrr′ , where H(Bˆ′1|E)σˆλµrr′
refers to the value that would be given by the conditional states σˆλµrr
′
E|b1 . Also, since σ
λµ10
E|axby = σ
λµ00
E|axby , we have
σˆλµ10E|b1 = (1− p)σ
λµ10
E|b1 + pσ
λµ10
E|b1 = (1− p)σ
λµ00
E|b1 + pσ
λµ00
E|b1 = σˆ
λµ00
E|b1 . (B11)
Since entropy is invariant under relabelling of basis states, this implies H(Bˆ′1|E)σˆλµ10 = H(Bˆ′1|E)σˆλµ00 , which in
turn equals H(Bˆ′1|E)ρˆλµ . Additionally, since H(Bˆ′1|E) can be computed entirely in terms of the eigenvalues of
the conditional states, which are invariant under complex conjugation, we have H(Bˆ′1|E)σˆλµ01 = H(Bˆ′1|E)σˆλµ00
and H(Bˆ′1|E)σˆλµ11 = H(Bˆ′1|E)σˆλµ10 . Put together, this implies that H(Bˆ′1|ERR′R′′)σˆ =
∑
λµ pλµH(Bˆ
′
1|E)σˆλµ00 =∑
λµ pλµH(Bˆ
′
1|E)ρˆλµ , as claimed
In summary, we can without loss of generality consider a state of the form (B6). For the calculations in the
subsequent section, we will for brevity replace the states σλµA′B′ERR′ with pure states |Ψλµ〉〈Ψλµ|A′B′E such that the
reduced states on A′B′ match, i.e. TrERR′ [σ
λµ
A′B′ERR′ ] = TrE [|Ψλµ〉〈Ψλµ|A′B′E ]. (This can be done without reducing
Eve’s power, since it is isometrically equivalent to giving Eve purifications of the states σλµA′B′ .) Explicitly, this means
we consider a state of the form ∑
λµ
pλµ|λµ〉〈λµ|A′′B′′ ⊗ |λµ〉〈λµ|R′′ ⊗ |Ψλµ〉〈Ψλµ|A′B′E , (B12)
where the state |Ψλµ〉 ∈ C2A′ ⊗ C2B′ ⊗HE inside each block is of the form
|Ψλµ〉 =
4∑
i=1
√
Li|i〉E |Φi〉A′B′ , (B13)
with L1 ≥ L2 and L3 ≥ L4, and where the states |i〉E form an orthonormal basis for a 4-dimensional subspace ofHE . (To be precise, each value of (λ, µ) potentially corresponds to a different Bell basis, weights Li and orthonormal
states |i〉E , but for brevity we will not explicitly denote this.)
Appendix C: Eve’s entropies
In order to obtain the security guarantee for our protocol, we need a lower bound on
H(Bˆ′1|E) = H(Bˆ′1)− (H(E)−H(Bˆ′1|E))
when the symmetrized statistics P′(a, b|x, y) are observed (c.f. Appendix A). When symmetrisation is applied we have
H(Bˆ′1) = H(B1) = 1, so it suffices to find an upper bound on
H(E)−H(E|Bˆ′1) = H(ρE)−
∑
b1
pb1H(ρˆE|b1). (C1)
Given the block-diagonal structure of the state ρABE , the quantity H(E)−H(E|Bˆ′1) is the weighted sum of the same
quantity across all subspaces labeled by λ and µ. Hence, the problem can be tackled by upper bounding this entropy
difference inside each block (we will explain this in more detail in Sec. C 2).
We hence focus on a single block specified by (λ, µ). For brevity, we will suppress the specification of the parameters
(λ, µ) in this subsection — it will be understood that we are considering a block specified by some particular value of
those parameters. For any state of the form of Eq. (B13), the entropy of Eve’s partial state is
H(E) = H
(
4∑
i=1
Li|i〉〈i|
)
= H(L). (C2)
9Bob’s measurement B1 is parametrized by a single angle φ, that is
B1 = cos(φ)Z + sin(φ)X. (C3)
To obtain Eve’s conditional entropy recall that Bob secretly decides to flip his measurement outcome with probability
p < 12 . Hence, Eve’s conditional states are given by the mixtures (from this point on, states are normalised unless
otherwise specified)
ρˆE|±1 = 2 (1− p) trA′B′
(
|Ψ〉〈Ψ|IA′E ⊗ IB
′ ±B1
2
)
+ 2 p trA′B′
(
|Ψ〉〈Ψ|IA′E ⊗ IB
′ ∓B1
2
)
= trA′B′ |Ψ〉〈Ψ|IA′E ⊗ (IB′ ± (1− 2p)B1).
(C4)
One can easily see that H(ρˆE|+1) = H(ρˆE|−1) (c.f. below), hence for the the state |Ψ〉 one has
H(E|B1) = H(ρˆE|+1) with
ρˆE|+1 =

L1 0
√
L1
√
L3
√
q cos(φ)
√
L1
√
L4
√
q sin(φ)
0 L2
√
L2
√
L3
√
q sin(φ) −√L2
√
L4
√
q cos(φ)√
L1
√
L3
√
q cos(φ)
√
L2
√
L3
√
q sin(φ) L3 0√
L1
√
L4
√
q sin(φ) −√L2
√
L4
√
q cos(φ) 0 L4
 (C5)
where it is convenient to introduce the parameter
q = (1− 2p)2 ∈ (0, 1]. (C6)
1. Dependence on Eve’s conditional entropy on the measurement angle φ
The entropy of a density matrix is a function of its eigenvalues, and can be obtained from the characteristic
polynomial of the matrix ρˆE|±1, which is
PL,q,φ(x) = det(xI− ρˆE|+1) = x4 − x3 + a2x2 + a1x+ a0 with
a0 = L1L2L3L4(q − 1)2
a1 = − (L1L2L3 + L2L4L3 + L1L2L4 + L1L3L4) (1− q)
a2 = (L1L2 + L3L2 + L4L2 + L1L3 + L1L4 + L3L4)
− 1
2
(L1 + L2) (L3 + L4) q − 1
2
(L1 − L2) (L3 − L4) q cos(2φ).
(C7)
Remarkably, P (x) only depends on the measurement angle φ via cos(2φ), and so does the entropy H(E|B1). In
particular, it implies H(ρˆE|+1) = H(ρˆE|−1), as mentioned previously, since the two states ρˆE|+1[φ] = ρˆE|−1[φ + pi]
are related by inverting the measurement direction and cos(2φ) = cos(2φ+ 2pi). Furthermore, one can express Eve’s
conditional entropy with the help of the variable C = cos(2φ) ∈ [−1, 1]
H(E|B1) = s(L, q, C) = H
(
Roots
[
PL,q,acos(C)/2(x)
])
, (C8)
as the Shannon entropy H of the list of roots of the polynomial PL,q,acos(C)/2(x) in Eq. (C7). The rest of this section
is devoted to the proof of the following statement.
Proposition 1. The conditional entropy of Eve s(L, q, C) is a monotonically decreasing function of C.
Proof. In the characteristic polynomial PC(x) = PL,q,C of Eq.(C7), only the coefficient a2 has a dependence on C. It
will be convenient to express PC as
PC(x) = P0(x) + ξCx
2 with ξ = −1
2
q(L1 − L2)(L3 − L4) ≤ 0, (C9)
where P0(x) = PC=0(x) does not depend on C. Note that for ξ = 0 the characteristic polynomial does not depend on
C and the theorem holds trivially, so that we assume ξ < 0 in the following. Since PC is the characteristic polynomial
of a density matrix it has four real roots pi ∈ [0, 1] – the eigenvalues of the state with the convention pi ≥ pi+1, so
PC(x) = (x− p1)(x− p2)(x− p3)(x− p4). (C10)
The remainder of the proof is done in three steps:
10
A. First, we show that the nontrivial case is where the roots of the polynomial are not degenerate; p1 > p2 > p3 > p4.
For all other cases the proof of the theorem is either straightforward, or the values pi are incompatible with
eigenvalues of Eve’s state conditional on the considered measurement.
B. Given the dependence of the polynomial PC(x) on C we express the derivatives of the roots p
′
i with respect to
C as simple functions of pi and ξ. This allows us to express the rate of entropy change as H
′(p) in a rather
simple form.
C. By an appropriate change of variables we show that sign(H ′(p)) = sign(G), where G is a simple function of
three real parameters restricted to some intervals. Finally, we show that G ≤ 0 on the whole of its domain.
This implies H ′(p) ≤ 0 and proves the theorem.
A. First, we show that if C > −1 any two eigenvalues can not be degenerate unless they are equal to zero. We will
prove it by contradiction. Assume that there are two such eigenvalues pk = pk+1 6= 0 for some value C¯ ∈ (−1, 1), the
characteristic polynomial reads
PC¯(x) = (x− pk)2(x− p)(x− p′). (C11)
The polynomial PC¯(x) is tangent to the y = 0 line at x = pk and has two other intersections with the y = 0 line at
x = p and x = p′. It follows that PC¯(x) + δx2 has at most two real roots for any positive δ. Hence, the perturbed
polynomial PC¯−δ(x) = PC¯ − δξx2 only has two real roots and does not correspond to a valid density matrix. This
is a contradiction, since for C > −1 the value C¯ − δ corresponds to a valid measurement angle for some positive δ
and should lead to a valid conditional states (with four real eigenvalues). We have thus proved that there are two
possibilities
(i) p1 > p2 ≥ p3 = p4 = 0,
(ii) p1 > p2 > p3 > p4.
(C12)
The case (i) requires a1 = a0 = 0 in Eq. (C7), which means that at least two of the Li are zero. Given that ξ 6= 0
and the partial ordering of Li it only leaves one possibilities L4 = L2 = 0. In this case one can straightforwardly
compute the two nonzero eigenvalues of ρˆE|+1 given by
p± =
1
2
(
L1 + L3 ±
√
2L3L1q(1 + C) + (L1 − L3)2
)
. (C13)
From this expression it is obvious that the purity of Eve’s conditional state increases with C, while its entropy
decreases.
B. The case p1 > p2 > p3 > p4 is more interesting. We will now study how the eigenvalues pi change under small
perturbations of C → C + δ for −1 < C < 1. By continuity, we know that the four roots pi(C) of the polynomial
PC(x) in Eq.(C10) are differentiable functions of C. Let us express the roots of the perturbed polynomials PC+δ(x)
as pi(C + δ) = pi(C) + ∆
i
δ, with p
′
i =
dpi(C)
dC = limδ→0
∆iδ
δ . Given the identify PC+δ(x) = PC(x) + δξx
2 we have for
each i
0 = PC+δ
(
pi(C + δ)
)
= PC+δ
(
pi + ∆
i
δ
)
= PC
(
pi + ∆
i
δ
)
+ δξ(pi + ∆
i
δ
)2
=⇒ PC
(
pi + ∆
i
δ
)
= −δξ(pi + ∆iδ
)2
.
(C14)
We develop the last expression in first order of δ. Given that PC
(
x+ ∆iδ
)
= PC
(
x) + dPC(x)dx ∆
i
δ + o(δ), we get for each
i
PC(pi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
dPC(x)
dx
|x=pi∆iδ = −δξp2i . (C15)
This implies in the limit δ → 0
p′i = −ξ
p2i
dPC(x)
dx |x=pi
= −ξ p
2
i∏
k 6=i(pi − pk)
. (C16)
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Ultimately, we are interested in the entropy H(p) = −∑i pi log(pi) and its susceptibility to variations of C. For
convenience, we use a natural logarithm log instead of log2 in the definition of the entropy here and until the end of
Sec. C 1. This does not affect the validity of the following discussion as the two entropies are related by a constant
factor. Our aim is to show that Eq. (C16) implies that H ′(p) = dH(p)dC is negative. Let us first express this quantity
−H ′(p) =
∑
i
(
p′i log(pi) + pi
p′i
pi
)
=
∑
i
p′i log(pi) +
∑
i
p′i =
∑
i
p′i log(pi).
Combining the previous expression with Eq. (C16) gives
H ′(p) = ξ
∑
i
p2i log(pi)
Πk 6=i(pi − pk) . (C17)
Given that ξ < 0, we want to show that F (p) =
∑
i
p2i log(pi)
Πk 6=i(pi−pk) is positive. To do so, let us change the variables
p1 > p2 > p3 > p4 to
p1 = p, p2 = r1p, p3 = r2p2 = r1r2p, and p4 = r3p3 = r1r2r3p, (C18)
with 14 ≤ p ≤ 1, 0 < r1,2 < 1, and 0 ≤ r3 < 1 (we already covered the case where p3 = p4 = 0). We express
F (p) =
∑
i
p2i log(pi)
Πk 6=i(pi − pk) =
∑
i
p2i log(
pi
p p)
Πk 6=i(pi − pk) =
∑
i
p2i (log(
pi
p ) + log(p))
Πk 6=i(pi − pk)
=
∑
i
p2i log(
pi
p )
Πk 6=i(pi − pk) + log(p)
∑
i
p2i
Πk 6=i(pi − pk) .
From Eq. (C16) it follows that the second term in the last line is zero. Indeed
log(p)
∑
i
p2i
Πk 6=i(pi − pk) = log(p)
∑
p′i
−ξ = −
log(p)
ξ
(∑
i
pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
)′
= 0.
Hence, we obtain
F (p) =
∑
i
p2i log(
pi
p )
Πk 6=i(pi − pk) =
1
p
∑
i
(pip )
2 log(pip )
Πk 6=i((pip )− (pip ))
=
1
p
(
r21 log(r1)
(r1 − 1)(r1 − r1r2)(r1 − r1r2r3) +
r21r
2
2 log(r1r2)
(r1r2 − 1)(r1r2 − r1)(r1r2 − r1r2r3) +
r21r
2
2r
2
3 log(r1r2r3)
(r1r2r3 − 1)(r1r2r3 − r1)(r1r2r3 − r1r2)
)
.
C. Straightforward manipulations allow one to rewrite this expression as
F (p) = − (1− r2)(1− r2r3)
p(1− r1r2r3) G(r) with
G(r) =
1
1− r1r2
(
log(r1)
1− r1 − r2
log(r2)
1− r2
)
− r2r3
1− r2r3
(
log(r2)
1− r2 − r3
log(r3)
1− r3
)
.
(C19)
Given that the prefactor − (1−r2)(1−r2r3)p(1−r1r2r3) is always negative, we want to show that G(r) ≤ 0 for all r1, r2 ∈ (0, 1) and
r3 ∈ [0, 1). To do so we change the variables again to
r = r2, x = r1r2, and y = r3r2 (C20)
with r ∈ (0, 1), x ∈ (0, r) and y ∈ [0, r). With the new variables, G can be expressed as
G(r, x, y) =
r
r − x
(
log(x)
1− x −
log(r)
1− r
)
+
y
r − y
(
y log(y)
1− y −
r log(r)
1− r
)
. (C21)
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Let us analyze the two terms separately. For this, it will be useful to use the following bound on the logarithm
function, valid for 0 < x ≤ 1 [41]:
x2 − 1
2x
≤ log(x) ≤ 2x− 1
x+ 1
. (C22)
FIG. 3: The plots of f1(x) =
log(x)
1−x and f2(y) =
y log(y)
1−y .
First, consider the function f1(x) =
log(x)
1−x ∈ (−∞,−1], depicted in the left half of Fig. 3. This function is concave
because its second derivative is negative:
f ′′1 (x) = −
1− 4x+ 3x2 − 2x2 log(x)
(1− x)3x2 ≤ 0 (C23)
⇔ 1− 4x+ 3x2 − 2x2 log(x) ≥ 0 (C24)
⇐ 1− 4x+ 3x2 − 2x22x− 1
x+ 1
≥ 0 (C25)
⇔ (1− x)3 ≥ 0, (C26)
where we used Eq. (C22). Therefore, the ratio f1(x)−f1(r)r−x is increasing with x (x < r) and taking the limit x → r
implies
f1(x)− f1(r)
r − x ≤ −f
′
1(r) = −
1
(1− r)r −
log(r)
(1− r)2 . (C27)
Second, we consider the function f2(y) =
y log(y)
1−y ∈ [−1, 0], depicted in the right half of Fig. 3. Using Eq. (C22), we
deduce
f ′′2 (y) =
−y2 + 2y log(y) + 1
(1− y)3y ≥ 0
⇔ −y2 + 2y log(y) + 1 ≥ 0
⇔ log(y) ≥ y
2 − 1
2y
(C28)
i.e. the function f2(y) is concave. Therefore,
f2(y)−f2(r)
r−y is decreasing with r yielding a bound when y < r at the limit
r → y
f2(y)− f2(r)
r − y ≤ −f
′
2(y) = −
1− y + log(y)
(1− y)2 . (C29)
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Then, it follows that
y
f2(y)− f2(r)
r − y ≤ −y
1− y + log(y)
(1− y)2 =: f3(y). (C30)
Furthermore, using log(y) ≤ y − 1 we obtain
f ′3(y) = −
2(1− y) + (1 + y) log(y)
(1− y)3 ≥ 0
⇔ −2(1− y)− (1 + y) log(y) ≥ 0
⇔ log(y) ≤ 2y − 1
1 + y
(C31)
(see Ineq. (C22) for the last inequality). Therefore f3 is an increasing function and
y
f2(y)− f2(r)
r − y ≤ f3(y) ≤ f3(r) = −r
1− r + log(r)
(1− r)2 . (C32)
Plugging the two inequalities (C27) and (C32) into (C21) gives
G = r
f1(x)− f1(r)
r − x + y
f2(y)− f2(r)
r − y (C33)
≤ −rf ′1(r) + f3(r) (C34)
= − 1
(1− r) −
r log(r)
(1− r)2 − r
1− r + log(r)
(1− r)2 (C35)
=
r2 − 2r log(r)− 1
(1− r)2 ≤ r
2 − 2r log(r)− 1 ≤ 0, (C36)
where the last inequality has been derived using Ineq. (C22).
2. Eve’s information vs CHSH score.
Following the logic of the main text, our next step towards the security guarantee is to bound Eve’s information,
i.e. to bound Eq. (C1) from the observed CHSH score S between Alice and Bob. We thus want to find the worst case
value of
I(S) = max
ρABE ,B1
H(E)−H(E|Bˆ′1)
s.t. 〈CHSH〉 = trρABE
(
A1 ⊗ (B1 ⊗B2) +A2 ⊗ (B1 −B2)
)⊗ IE ≥ S. (C37)
Given the block diagonal structure of the state ρABE and the measurement operators, both quantities are averaged
over all the subspaces
H(E)−H(E|Bˆ′1) =
∑
λµ
pλµ
(
H(Lλµ)−H(ρˆλµE|+1)
)
〈CHSH〉 =
∑
λµ
pλµ〈CHSH〉λµ =
∑
λµ
pλµ〈Ψλµ|
(
Aλ1 ⊗ (Bµ1 ⊗Bµ2 ) +Aλ2 ⊗ (Bµ1 −Bµ2 )
)⊗ IE |Ψλµ〉, (C38)
where each state |Ψλµ〉 is the purification of the Bell-diagonal state as given in Eq. (B13) with the weights Lλµ, and
Eve’s conditional states ρˆλµE|+1 have the form of Eq. (C5). (We used the equality H(ρˆ
λµ
E|+1) = H(ρˆ
λµ
E|−1) and the fact
that the probability for each outcome ±1 is the same.) It follows that any bound one derives for a restriction to the
qubit subspaces
H(Lλµ)−H(ρˆλµE|+1) ≤ I (〈CHSH〉λµ) , (C39)
will hold for the overall state if the function I is concave, since we would have
H(E)−H(E|Bˆ′1) =
∑
λµ
pλµ
(
H(Lλµ)−H(ρˆλµE|+1)
)
≤
∑
λµ
pλµI (〈CHSH〉λµ) ≤ I(〈CHSH〉). (C40)
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Furthermore, the bound is tight if the original inequality is.
In this section we will derive such a bound. In other words, we will solve the problem of Eq. (C37) within a single
subspace (from this point forward, we will again suppress explicit specification of the parameters (λ, µ)) with a state
ρA′B′E = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| as given in Eq. (B13) and Pauli measurements in the the X-Z plane (as discussed in Sec. B, this can
be done without loss of generality):
Ax = cos(αx)Z + sin(αx)X By = cos(βx)Z + sin(βx)X, (C41)
with β1 = φ.
Following the notation of [42] we get
ρAB = trE |Ψ〉〈Ψ| = 1
4
(II XX Y Y ZZ) ·
 L1 + L2 + L3 + L4L1 − L2 − L3 + L4−L1 − L2 + L3 + L4
L1 − L2 + L3 − L4
 . (C42)
Introducing the unit vectors by =
(cos(βy)
sin(βy)
)
and ax =
(
cos(αx)
sin(αx)
)
allows us to express the CHSH score as
〈CHSH〉 = bT1 Λ(a1 + a2) + bT2 Λ(a1 − a2)
with Λ =
(
L1 − L2 − L3 + L4
L1 − L2 + L3 − L4
)
.
(C43)
Since the entropies of Eve only depend on the measurement B1, we can directly maximize the expression above for the
remaining measurement directions a1,a2 and b2. This is easy to do noticing that the expressions 2 cos(θ)c1 = (a1+a2)
and 2 sin(θ)c2 = (a1 − a2) define two orthogonal unit vectors c1 and c2. Hence,
max
a1,a2,b2
〈CHSH〉 = max
cj ·ci=δij ,θ
2 cos(θ)bT1 Λc1 + 2 sin(θ)||Λc2|| = 2 max
cj ·ci=δij ,θ
(
cos(θ) sin(θ)
) · (bT1 Λc1||Λc2||
)
= 2 max
cj ·ci=δij
√(
bT1 Λc1
)2
+ ||Λc2||2.
(C44)
For the first equality, we used the fact that the maximum maxb2 b
T
2 Λc2 = ||Λc2|| is attained for b2 ‖ Λc2. The same
argument is used in the last equality for the maximization over the
(
cos(θ)
sin(θ)
)
vector. The last quantity in the equalities
above satisfies √(
bT1 Λc1
)2
+ ||Λc2||2 ≤
√
||Λc1||2 + ||Λc2||2 =
√
trΛ2, (C45)
which can always be attained for any measurement B1 by setting c1 ‖ Λb1. Hence, we find that the maximal CHSH
value of
〈CHSH〉 = 2
√
trΛ2 = 2
√
2
√
(L1 − L2) 2 + (L3 − L4) 2 (C46)
can be attained for any value of the setting of the key generating measurement b1 =
(
cos(φ)
sin(φ)
)
.
In addition, we know from Proposition 1 that Eve’s conditional entropy is minimal when the value of cos(2φ) is
maximal, i.e. φ = 0. This corresponds to the worst case maximizing H(E)−H(E|Bˆ′1). Hence, we get
I(S) = max
L
H(L)−H(ρˆE|+1|φ=0)
s.t. 〈CHSH〉 = 2
√
2
√
(L1 − L2) 2 + (L3 − L4) 2 ≥ S,
(C47)
with
H(ρˆE|+1|φ=0) = H


L1 0
√
L1
√
L3
√
q 0
0 L2 0 −
√
L2
√
L4
√
q√
L1
√
L3
√
q 0 L3 0
0 −√L2
√
L4
√
q 0 L4

 = H(p) (C48)
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for
p =

1
2
(
L1 + L3 +
√
4L1L3q + (L1 − L3)2
)
1
2
(
L1 + L3 −
√
4L1L3q + (L1 − L3)2
)
1
2
(
L2 + L4 +
√
4L2L4q + (L2 − L4)2
)
1
2
(
L2 + L4 −
√
4L2L4q + (L2 − L4)2
)
 . (C49)
Given the form of p, it is convenient to do the following change of variables
L1 = Px, L3 = P (1− x), L2 = (1− P )y, and L4 = (1− P )(1− y), (C50)
with x, y, P ∈ [0, 1]. The partial ordering of the L coefficients implies{
Px ≥ (1− P )y
P (1− x) ≥ (1− P )(1− y) =⇒ (1− P )y ≤ Px ≤ (1− P )y + 2P − 1 (C51)
which requires P ≥ 12 . The maximization given in Eq. (C47) can be rewritten in terms of the new variables as
I(S) = max
P,x,y
Phq(x) + (1− P )hq(y) (C52)
s.t. 〈CHSH〉 = 2
√
2
√
(P (x+ y − 2)− y + 1)2 + (y − P (x+ y))2 ≥ S, (C53)
with
hq(z) = h(z)− h(nq(z))
h(z) = −z log(z)− (1− z) log(1− z)
nq(z) =
1 +
√
1− 4 (1− q) z(1− z)
2
.
(C54)
Here h(z) is the binary entropy function and log(z) is the logarithm in base 2.
We start by listing some properties of the hq function that we will prove at the end of the section. First, one easily
verifies that it is symmetric around z = 1/2: hq(z) = hq(1 − z). Its values at the boundaries are hq(0) = hq(1) = 0.
In addition, its derivative h′q(z) is strictly decreasing with z, that is to say h
′′
q (z) < 0. In particular, this implies that
hq(z) is a concave function that increases monotonically for z ≤ 1/2.
Let us now fix the value of P and consider the curve in the (x, y)-plane that corresponds to a constant CHSH score
0 = d〈CHSH〉 = d〈CHSH〉
dx
dx+
d〈CHSH〉
dy
dy ∝ Pdx− (1− P )dy. (C55)
The CHSH score remains constant if Pdx = (1 − P )dy. Hence, we write dx = (1 − P )dµ and dy = Pdµ which
parametrize the one-dimensional curve of constant 〈CHSH〉 and P in the x− y space with a single parameter µ. The
full curve is given by
(x, y)µ =
(
(1− P )µ+ x0, Pµ
)
for µ ∈ [0, 1
P
] (C56)
and for any value 0 ≤ x0 ≤ 2P−1P . (Note that the bounds on µ and x0 come from the constraints on L.) We are
interested in maximizing Eve’s information H(L) − H(p) along the curve. To do so we express the infinitesimal
variation of this quantity along the curve, we have
d(H(L)−H(p)) = Ph′q(x)dx+ (1− P )h′q(y) = (h′q(x) + h′q(y))dµ. (C57)
Thus, Eve’s information has a local extremum for h′q(x) = −h′q(y). Given the symmetry of hq and the fact that
h′q is strictly decreasing, this equality can only be fulfilled if x and y are symmetric around
1
2 , that is x + y = 1.
Furthermore, the unique extremum is actually a local maximum as the second derivative is negative
d2(H(L)−H(p))
dµ2
=
1
P
h′′q (x) +
1
1− P h
′′
q (y) < 0, (C58)
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since h′′q (z) < 0.
By continuity it follows that x + y = 1 is also the global maximum of H(L) − H(p) along the µ-curve. Hence
without loss of generality we can set y = 1−x in our constrained maximization. The functions of interest then become
I(S) = max
x,P
hq(x)
s.t. 〈CHSH〉 = 2
√
2− 4(1− P )P − 4(1− x)x ≥ S,
(C59)
where we used hq(x) = hq(1− x).
We want to find the highest possible value of I compatible with the observed value of CHSH. Since hq(x) is
independent of P, we can take the value of P leading to the lowest constraint on x, i.e. P = 1 (recall that P ≥ 12 )
which maximizes the CHSH score to 〈CHSH〉 = 2√2√1− 2x(1− x). This implies
H(L)−H(p) ≤ IE(S; q) = hq
1
2
(
1 +
√
2
(
S
2
√
2
)2
− 1
) . (C60)
A sketch of the function IE(S; q) for different choices of the parameter q is given in Fig. 4. One notices that our whole
construction is tight, i.e. it identifies a strategy for Eve that attains the bound.
For convenience, we write below the explicit formula for the right hand side of the inequality (C60) in terms of the
original parameter p. Using q = (1− 2p)2 and Eq. (C54) we get
H(L)−H(p) ≤ Ip(S) = IE(S; (1− 2p)2) = h
(
1 +
√
(S/2)2 − 1
2
)
− h
(
1 +
√
1− (1− p)p (8− S2)
2
)
. (C61)
IE(S;q)
S
FIG. 4: The upper bound IE(S; q) on Eve’s information versus the CHSH score S for noisy-preprocessing values q = (1−2p)2 =
1, 0.9, 0.7 and 0.5 (from top to bottom).
Properties of the hq function. First, note that hq=0(z) = h(z)− h(z) = 0, which also follows from the fact that
for q = 0 Bob replaces his outcome by a private random bit. The symmetry of the function hq(z) = hq(1− z) trivially
follows from the symmetry of the binary entropy h(z) = h(1− z) and of the function nq(z) = nq(1− z). Its values at
the boundaries are given by
hq(0) = hq(1) = h(0)− h(0) = 0. (C62)
Similarly, one can obtain the derivative at the boundaries. For q > 0 one has
h′q(0) = −h′q(1) = lim
z→0+
h′(z)− h′(nq(z))n′q(z) = lim
z→0+
− log(z) + log ((1− q)z)(1− q)
= lim
z→0+
− log(z) + log(z1−q) + (1− q) log(1− q) = lim
z→0+
− log(zq) + (1− q) log(1− q) =∞. (C63)
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Finally, for the second derivative we have
h′′q (z) = h
′′(z)− h′′(nq(z))(n′q(z))2 − h′(nq(z))n′′q (z)
= − 1
z(1− z) −
1
(1− q)z(1− z)
(1− q)2(1− 2z)2
1− 4(1− q)z(1− z) +
tanh−1
(√
1− 4(1− q)z(1− z)
)
4(1− q)q
(1− 4(q + 1)z(1− z))3/2
= − q
(1− z)z(1− 4(1− q)z(1− z)) +
tanh−1
(√
1− 4(1− q)z(1− z)
)
4(1− q)q
(1− 4(q + 1)z(1− z))3/2 .
(C64)
Introducing 0 ≤ R(q, z) = 4(1− q)z(1− z) < 1 (here R < 1 follows from q > 0) the expression simplifies to
h′′q (z) = 4q(1− q)
(
− 1
R(1−R) +
tanh−1(
√
1−R)
(1−R)3/2
)
=
4q(1− q)
(1−R)3/2
(
−
√
1−R
R
+ tanh−1
(√
1−R
))
. (C65)
The second derivative h′′q (z) is thus negative if
√
1−R
R ≥ tanh−1
(√
1−R). Replacing ζ = √1−R and using
tanh−1(ζ) = 12 log
(
1+ζ
1−ζ
)
we rewrite this inequality as
2ζ
1− ζ2 ≥ log
(
1 + ζ
1− ζ
)
. (C66)
This is easy to prove by noting that the two terms are equal at ζ = 0:
2ζ
1− ζ2 |ζ=0 = log
(
1 + ζ
1− ζ
)
|ζ=0 = 0, (C67)
while the left hand side term grows faster
d
dζ
(
2ζ
1− ζ2
)
= 2
1 + ζ2
(1− ζ2)2 ≥ 2
1
1− ζ2 =
d
dζ
log
(
1 + ζ
1− ζ
)
, (C68)
with equality only for ζ = 0. Hence, we have shown that h′′(z) ≤ 0, with h′′(z) = 0 only possible for ζ = 0. However,
ζ = 0 corresponds to R = 1 and is impossible for q > 0. We have thus proved that
h′′q (z) < 0. (C69)
Appendix D: Statistics obtained with a SPDC source and photon counting
1. Modelization of the source and detection devices
a. Source – We consider a source generating entangled photon pairs according to
|ψ〉 = (1− T 2g )N/2(1− T 2g¯ )N/2ΠNk=1eTga
†
kb
†
k,⊥−Tg¯a†k,⊥b†k |0〉.
This describes a bi-partite state where the first party, Alice, measures the modes labelled by the bosonic operators
ak and ak,⊥ and the second party, Bob, measures bk and bk,⊥. In the mono-mode case where k takes a single value,
entanglement appears clearly between the modes labelled with and without the index ⊥ . k is here used to account
for multiple emission modes. Tg = tanh g and similarly Tg¯ = tanh g¯ where g and g¯ indicate squeezing parameters
related to a†kb
†
k,⊥ and a
†
k,⊥b
†
k respectively, can be changed to tune the amount of entanglement per pair. Below, we
first consider the mono-mode case (the index k is omitted), compute the statistics and show how it can be extended
to the multi-mode case at the end.
b. Detector – We consider photon detectors which do not resolve the photon number. The event ”no-click” is
modelled by
Dˆa(ηa) = (1− padc)(1− ηa)a
†a (D1)
where a specifies the mode which is detected. ηa is the detection efficiency (overall detection efficiency including all
the lost from the source to the detector) and padc the dark count probability.
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c. Setting choice – Rotations are possibly performed before the detections so that the photons can be measured
in several basis. The detected modes are called A and A⊥ for Alice and are related to the emission modes by
a = CαA+ Sαe
iφαA⊥ (D2)
a⊥ = Sαe−iφαA− CαA⊥ (D3)
with Cα = cos(α) and Sα = sin(α) and similarly for Bob.
d. Summary The state which is effectively measured can be written as
|ψα,φα,β,φβ 〉 =
(
1− T 2g
) 1
2
(
1− T 2g¯
) 1
2 e
(A†,A†⊥)M
B†
B†⊥

|0〉 (D4)
with
M =
(
TgCαSβe
−iφβ − Tg¯Sαe−iφαCβ −TgCαCβ − Tg¯Sαe−iφαSβeiφβ
TgSαe
iφαSβe
−iφβ + Tg¯CαCβ −TgSαeiφαCβ + Tg¯CαSβeiφβ
)
. (D5)
It is measured according to a model where the POVM element associated to a no-click in detector A is given by
DˆA(ηA) = (1− pAdc)(1− ηA)A
†A (D6)
and similarly for A⊥, B and B⊥.
2. Derivation of the full statistics
The no-click events can all be computed in a similar way. Consider for example the probability p(ncA) of having a
no-click in A
p(ncA) = (1− pAdc)Tr
(
R
A†A/2
A |ψα,φα,β,φβ 〉〈ψα,φα,β,φβ |RA
†A/2
A
)
(D7)
with RA = 1− ηA. From xa†af(a†) = f(xa†)xa†a, we have
R
A†A/2
A |ψα,φα,β,φβ 〉 =
(
1− T 2g
) 1
2
(
1− T 2g¯
) 1
2 e
(A†,A†⊥)MRA
B†
B†⊥

|0〉 (D8)
with
MRA =
(
R
1/2
A (TgCαSβe
−iφβ − Tg¯Sαe−iφαCβ) R1/2A (−TgCαCβ − Tg¯Sαe−iφαSβeiφβ )
TgSαe
iφαSβe
−iφβ + Tg¯CαCβ −TgSαeiφαCβ + Tg¯CαSβeiφβ
)
. (D9)
Let λRA1 and λ
RA
2 be the singular values of MRA . We find
Tr
(
R
A†A/2
A |ψα,φα,β,φβ 〉〈ψα,φα,β,φβ |RA
†A/2
A
)
=
(
1− T 2g
) (
1− T 2g¯
)
(1− (λRA1 )2)(1− (λRA2 )2)
. (D10)
We deduce
p(ncA) = (1− pAdc)
(
1− T 2g
) (
1− T 2g¯
)
(1− (λRA1 )2)(1− (λRA2 )2)
. (D11)
In the multimode case where the source emits N independent modes, we simply have
p(ncA) = (1− pAdc)
( (
1− T 2g
) (
1− T 2g¯
)
(1− (λRA1 )2)(1− (λRA2 )2)
)N
. (D12)
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The full statistics can be derived in a similar way. In particular, by introducing
MRA,RA⊥ ,RB ,RB⊥ =
(
R
1/2
A R
1/2
B (TgCαSβe
−iφβ − Tg¯Sαe−iφαCβ) R1/2A R1/2B⊥ (−TgCαCβ − Tg¯Sαe−iφαSβeiφβ )
R
1/2
A⊥R
1/2
B (TgSαe
iφαSβe
−iφβ + Tg¯CαCβ) R
1/2
A⊥R
1/2
B⊥ (−TgSαeiφαCβ + Tg¯CαSβeiφβ )
)
(D13)
and the corresponding singular values λ
RA,RA⊥ ,RB ,RB⊥
1 and λ
RA,RA⊥ ,RB ,RB⊥
2 . We find
p(ncA) = (1− pAdc)
( (
1− T 2g
) (
1− T 2g¯
)
(1− (λRA,1,1,11 )2)(1− (λRA,1,1,12 )2)
)N
p(ncA⊥) = (1− pA⊥dc )
( (
1− T 2g
) (
1− T 2g¯
)
(1− (λ1,RA⊥ ,1,11 )2)(1− (λ
1,RA⊥ ,1,1
2 )
2)
)N
p(ncB) = (1− pBdc)
( (
1− T 2g
) (
1− T 2g¯
)
(1− (λ1,1,RB ,11 )2)(1− (λ1,1,RB ,12 )2)
)N
p(ncB⊥) = (1− pB⊥dc )
( (
1− T 2g
) (
1− T 2g¯
)
(1− (λ1,1,1,RB⊥1 )2)(1− (λ
1,1,1,RB⊥
2 )
2)
)N
.
The same line of thought applies to the joint probability
p(ncA&ncB) = (1− pAdc)(1− pBdc)
( (
1− T 2g
) (
1− T 2g¯
)
(1− (λRA,1,RB ,11 )2)(1− (λRA,1,RB ,12 )2)
)N
...
that is, the joint probability
p(nci&ncj) = (1− pidc)(1− pjdc)
 (1− T 2g ) (1− T 2g¯ )
(1− (λr
A
ij ,r
A⊥
ij ,r
B
ij ,r
B⊥
ij
1 )
2)(1− (λr
A
ij ,r
A⊥
ij ,r
B
ij ,r
B⊥
ij
2 )
2)
N
i, j standing for A,A⊥, B or B⊥ and
r`ij = R` if i or j equals ` (D14)
= 1 otherwise. (D15)
Similarly
p(nci&ncj&nck) = (1− pidc)(1− pjdc)(1− pkdc)
 (1− T 2g ) (1− T 2g¯ )
(1− (λr
A
ijk,r
A⊥
ijk ,r
B
ijk,r
B⊥
ijk
1 )
2)(1− (λr
A
ijk,r
A⊥
ijk ,r
B
ijk,r
B⊥
ijk
2 )
2)
N
i, j, k standing for A,A⊥, B or B⊥ and
r`ijk = R` if i or j or k equals ` (D16)
= 1 otherwise. (D17)
Finally
p(ncA&ncA⊥&ncB&ncB⊥) = (1−pAdc)(1−pA⊥dc )(1−pBdc)(1−pB⊥dc )
( (
1− T 2g
) (
1− T 2g¯
)
(1− (λRA,RA⊥ ,RB ,RB⊥1 )2)(1− (λ
RA,RA⊥ ,RB ,RB⊥
2 )
2)
)N
3. Derivation of the CHSH value
To compute the CHSH value, the parties need to bin their results, i.e. they have to decide how to group their four
possible events to get outcome ±1. Alice (Bob) chooses to assign the value −1 when the detectors A (B) clicks whereas
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A⊥ (B⊥) does not and +1 to the three remaining events. Hence, p(−1,−1|x, y) = Tr
(
(1 − DˆA(ηA))DˆA⊥(ηA,⊥)(1 −
DˆB(ηB))DˆB⊥(ηB,⊥)|ψα,φα,β,φβ 〉〈ψα,φα,β,φβ |
)
, which can be related to the no-detection probabilities derived pre-
viously via p(ncA⊥&ncB⊥) − p(ncA&ncA⊥&ncB⊥) − p(ncA⊥&ncB&ncB⊥) + p(ncA&ncA⊥&ncB&ncB⊥). Processing
p(+1,−1|x, y), p(−1,+1|x, y) and p(+1,+1|x, y) in a similar way gives an expression for the CHSH value as a func-
tion of the squeezing parameters g - g¯, the number of modes N, the measurement settings, the detection efficiencies
and dark count probabilities.
4. Comparison with an ideal source
As discussed in the main text, we computed the requirement on the detection efficiency using various security
proofs in a setup using polarisation entanglement produced by means of a SPDC source. It is instructive to compare
this requirement when using an ideal source producing two-qubit entangled states.
For the protocol proposed in Ref. [21], the requirement on the global detection efficiency is 92.7% when using a
SPDC source, which is 3.4% higher than if one used a perfect two-qubit source. Conversely, when using the security
proof that is proposed in this manuscript that employs noisy pre-processing with error correction that uses the four-
valued outcome A0 instead of its binarization as proposed in Ref. [36], the global detection efficiency when a SPDC
source is used is 83.2%, which is only 0.4% higher compared to the case of a perfect qubit source. We conclude that
developing a photon pair source producing exactly two-qubit entangled states is not a priority when considering the
first photonic implementation of device-independent quantum key distribution.
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